What is Social Constructivism, and Does it Really Support Kiwi Learners?
The following is an essay I wrote as part of my studies in 2018. It was something I felt pretty strongly about, so I asked my lecturer if I could create my own essay question for one assignment. To his credit, he was very open-minded toward my suggestion. He also gave me some useful feedback and a good grade. So it's not all gloom and doom!
It's quite a long read, but hopefully quite informative. I try and explain what constructivism is and then go ahead to summarize some of the best critiques for it, as well as describing the relevance of this issue to New Zealand educational practice. I did struggle somewhat to strike a healthy balance between breadth and depth whilst staying within the word limit (actually, I went a little over). So to any philosophers reading this: I apologise for the lack of rigour.
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Constructivism and the Support Provided to Learners by Educational Psychologists in Aotearoa
Educational psychology is neither straightforward nor boring. Learning – a cognitive activity – can only be inferred indirectly and fallibly. Every student’s learning journey is affected by a unique mix of contextual factors, often only researched at a generalized, population-level. This epistemic[1] predicament is paired with an interpersonal one: the psychologist, student, teachers, family and others likely each have their own interests, interpretations and expectations. Ethics and good practice demand that psychologists listen to stakeholders’ perspectives. But what if they’re wrong?
Constructivism suggests a way out of this dilemma. It holds that because of the “constructed” nature of knowledge, truth and/or evidence play a limited role in accounting for knowledge. Thus, constructivism typically touches upon both psychological theories of learning and epistemology (Carr, et al., 1994; Matthews, 2015). Constructivists often draw implications for psychological assessment and research as well as pedagogy* (Carr, et al., 1994).
Matthews (2015; see also Bell, 2005) divides constructivism into two broad traditions: psychological constructivism and sociological constructivism. The former is concerned with the psychological processes of learning, often drawing from the work of Jean Piaget (stressing the personal nature of construction) or Lev Vygotsky (conceptualizing learning as an inherently social process). Sociological constructivism characterizes phenomena such as learning, education and science in purely sociological, or even hermeneutic* terms.
Constructivism is of monolithic influence within education, both internationally (Matthews, 1998a; 2015), and within Aotearoa (Matthews, 1998a). Constructivist theories and frameworks for supporting learners have substantially informed policy (e.g. Loveridge, 2010); it is our “official pedagogical theory” (Matthews, 2015), embedded in our science curriculum, the Reading Recovery programme (Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013; Tunmer & Chapman, 2015), and many other national programmes serving the laudable goals of inclusion and pluralism (e.g. Te Kotahitanga, www.tekotahitanga.tki.org.nz).
Dennett (1995, p. 21) once said “…there is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.” Below, I summarize some constructivist views on learning, knowledge and teaching, and their impact on education in Aotearoa. I argue that too often, constructivist ideology goes unchallenged, to the detriment of both theory and practice – including assessment and programmes for supporting learning. Educational psychologists have an ethical obligation to reject the dogma of constructivism.
Matthews (2015; see also Bell, 2005) divides constructivism into two broad traditions: psychological constructivism and sociological constructivism. The former is concerned with the psychological processes of learning, often drawing from the work of Jean Piaget (stressing the personal nature of construction) or Lev Vygotsky (conceptualizing learning as an inherently social process). Sociological constructivism characterizes phenomena such as learning, education and science in purely sociological, or even hermeneutic* terms.
Constructivism is of monolithic influence within education, both internationally (Matthews, 1998a; 2015), and within Aotearoa (Matthews, 1998a). Constructivist theories and frameworks for supporting learners have substantially informed policy (e.g. Loveridge, 2010); it is our “official pedagogical theory” (Matthews, 2015), embedded in our science curriculum, the Reading Recovery programme (Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013; Tunmer & Chapman, 2015), and many other national programmes serving the laudable goals of inclusion and pluralism (e.g. Te Kotahitanga, www.tekotahitanga.tki.org.nz).
Dennett (1995, p. 21) once said “…there is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.” Below, I summarize some constructivist views on learning, knowledge and teaching, and their impact on education in Aotearoa. I argue that too often, constructivist ideology goes unchallenged, to the detriment of both theory and practice – including assessment and programmes for supporting learning. Educational psychologists have an ethical obligation to reject the dogma of constructivism.
An Uncontentious Starting Point
Psychological constructivism begins with the somewhat reasonable (though arguably 'trivial'; von Glasersfeld, 1988, cited in Cobern & Loving, 2008, p. 433) assertion that learning involves some form of active construction on the part of the learner (Bell, 2005; Carr, et al., 1994). Constructivists disagree on the details (Jenkins, 2000; Nola, 1998), but most hold that knowledge is constructed in interaction either with other people, or the learner’s sensory experiences. These claims are often derived from a reading of Vygotsky and Piaget, respectively (Matthews, 2015)[2].
This fundamental insight is indeed trivial. One can easily agree that the concept of a table (rather than table itself) is some sort of psychological and/or social construction. Moreover, contrary to oft-repeated assertions by constructivists (von Glasersfeld 1990a, cited in Matthews, 2015), the importance of active engagement in learning has been widely recognized since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus (Jowett, n.d.; Nola, 1998). Determining the nature of this constructive process critical to informing the choice and interpretation of psychological assessments, as well as the appropriate priorities for the support provided to learners. Unfortunately, social constructivists often assume that trivial constructivism has direct practical applications (Nola, 1998; Jenkins, 2000). To some of these conclusions I will now turn.
The Lord of the Flies Approach to Active Learning
Constructivism has deeply influenced curricula and learning support programmes for maths, science and reading in New Zealand and worldwide. Pedagogical constructivists draw attention to the way that knowledge is “constructed by scientists […] and reconstructed by each learner of science” (Bell, 2005, p. 36). Each learner must construct their own understandings, depending crucially upon their preexisting knowledge structures (Shulman 1994, cited in Koertge, 1998; Carr, et al., 1994). Constructivists therefore echo the prescriptions of the discovery, problem-based, inquiry and experiential schools of previous decades: advocating minimal teacher guidance, as this is said to interfere with learning (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Mayer, 2004; von Glasersfeld 1990a, cited in Matthews, 2015). Because “learning and science proceed the same way” (Harlen, 1996, cited in Jenkins, 2000, p. 600; see also Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Bell, 2005), science students may be encouraged to emulate scientific discoveries, or to explore their prior understanding of scientific concepts within group discussions (Bell, 2005; Carr, et al., 1994). New Zealand’s well-entrenched (Tunmer & Chapman, 2015; Chapman, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2015) multiple cues reading pedagogy strongly discourages guided, skills-based learning (i.e. phonics), instead encouraging children to utilize their natural capacity to make sense of books using contextual information such as pictures or story context (Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015; Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013).
Galileo and Vygotsky had it right: abstract scientific concepts (such as the motion of a pendulum) may not have a basis in, and may even be contradicted by appearances and folk categories (Nola, 2004; Rowlands, 2000; Jenkins, 2000; Koertge, 1998). Indeed, a valuable goal for science should be to “separate common sense from common nonsense and make uncommon sense more common” (Stern, 1993, cited in Dawes, 1994, p. 6; see also Matthews, 1998b; Matthews, 2015). It is simply unreasonable to expect students to discover or invent for themselves scientific concepts that were centuries in the making. (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Nola, 1998; Matthews, 1998a; Rowlands, 2000). Some concepts are best conveyed linguistically (Matthews, 2015; Jenkins, 2000). The plausible constructivist idea that children are active sense-makers entails virtually nothing about pedagogy (Matthews, 2015; Nola, 1998; Jenkins, 2000; Ministry of Education, 2008), leading Hirsch (1996, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 320) to call constructivism “a kind of magical incantation.”
Which teaching methods best encourage engagement and learning is an empirical question (Mayer, 2004). Cognitive psychology has already provided some answers. Very broad problem solving contexts diverting precious working memory resources away from cognitive activity that is likely to result in long-term memory encoding, explicit guidance avoids this problem (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015; Mayer, 2004; Jenkins, 2000).
Constructivist programmes have also been evaluated more directly. Evidence against ‘discovery’ learning in maths and science began accumulating in the 60s, yet every decade since then, the ideology has reemerged with new branding, only to fail to find empirical support (Mayer, 2004; see also Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). Strong evidence suggests that constructivist reading programmes (including Aotearoa’s Reading Recovery) are ineffective (Matthews, 2015; Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013; Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015) and contribute to the widening gap in literacy achievement in New Zealand (Chapman, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2015; Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013; Prochnow, Tunmer, & Arrow, 2015).
The usefulness of worked examples and other forms of teacher guidance is well documented, especially for less expert learners (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006), and the same is true for phonemic awareness training (Ehri, et al., 2001; Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015; Tunmer & Chapman, 2015), criticisms notwithstanding (Pressley & Allington, 1999; Troia, 1999). Furthermore, effective teachers have been shown to disregard constructivist prescriptions and guide students in their learning (Aulls, 2002, cited in Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006).
Constructivists such as Bell may reply that their position is “not the same as discovery learning” (Bell, 2005, p. 35) and that teachers may provide guidance where necessary, or that constructivism recognizes “the distinction between learning public science and scientists constructing new public knowledge” (Bell, 2005, p. 38). This is a backtrack to a trivial position. The importance of engagement and prior conceptions in learning are widely acknowledged and were noted by the ancient Greeks. (Matthews, 1998a; Matthews, 2015; Jowett, n.d.; Nola, 1998). Non-trivial constructivist calls for educators to minimize direct guidance, however, should be disregarded by practitioners interested in supporting learners.
By Constituting a Shark in and through Discourse, We May Thereby Jump it
Sociological constructivism is committed to the explaining away of apparent scientific progress by characterizing it in terms of sociopolitical factors or by closely analyzing the meanings of texts (hermeneutics) - the truth or evidence-base of a scientific theory is explicitly ruled out at the outset (Bloor, 1991, cited in Boudry & Buekens, 2011). Reality “is the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 313); constituted in and through discourse. (Woolgar, 1986, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 313).
Accordingly, Western science is just one ideology amongst many (Koertge, 1998), one that legitimizes the oppression of women (Gilbert, 1995, cited in Bell, 2005; Hale, 1992, cited in Sullivan, 2000), ethnic minorities (Boghossian, 1998; Cobern & Loving, 2001) and people with disabilities (Ballard, 2004; Lalvani & Broderick, 2015; Rutherford & MacArthur, 2018; Slee, 2001), amongst others. All belief systems deserve to be called knowledge (Barnes, 1977, cited in Nanda, 1998). Many New Zealand frameworks for educational assessment have been influenced by this postmodernist doctrine. Below, I briefly consider Narrative Inquiry (Annan, Priestly, & Phillipson, 2006; White & Epston, 1990), Bourke and Loveridge’s[3] (2013) model of Evidence-Based Practice (EBP), as well as a Kaupapa Māori elaboration on the latter (Macfarlane & Macfarlane, 2013). Te Kotahitanga, a Kaupapa Māori programme for culturally responsive teaching will also be briefly considered in a later section.
Narrative inquiry asserts that “we cannot know objective reality” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 2), drawing attention to “the arbitrary construction of meaning for events” (Annan, Priestly, & Phillipson, 2006, p. 21), and how psychologists can therefore explore alternative narratives for ‘problems’ with stakeholders. A practitioner is to embrace narratives based upon “ideological and prevailing cultural practices [but not] correctness or accuracy” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 5). Annan and colleagues argue that “there is ample evidence to suggest that narrative approaches make valuable contributions” though my initial examination of the six books cited suggests this evidence may all be anecdotal[4].
Bourke and Loveridge’s (2013) EBP model is presented in Figure 2. Bourke and Loveridge contend that EBP occurs only when research evidence is integrated with the knowledge of the practitioner, children, and their families. They speak of practitioners’ ability to consider the broader context when interpreting assessment and fine-tuning support for learners, as well as the value of their situated experience in evaluating the success of such practices. Bourke and Loveridge also stress the importance of truly understanding the perspectives and cultural values of young people and stakeholders, such as when determining priorities for the educational psychologist’s involvement.
Macfarlane and Macfarlane (2013) provide a complementary Kaupapa Māori perspective on EBP. They argue that practitioners should draw from “indigenous cultural realities in shaping knowledge bases and pedagogies”. Along with Bourke and Loveridge (2013), the authors make a strong case for the importance of stakeholder participation in research. However, neither account explains how personal anecdote is to be integrated with research evidence. Should tuakana teina - a concept I admire – have its pedagogical applications subjected to the scrutiny of “Western” science? What if the scientific verdict were to contradict this cultural reality?
The Plural of Anecdote is Not Data
Considering others’ perspectives and cultures does not require the uncritical elevation of anecdote’s status as evidence (Smith and Elley, 1996, cited in Chapman, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2015), however. The plural of anecdote is not data. Anecdote is unsystematic, fails to compare to a hypothetical counterfactual, relies on retrospective memory and is hence vulnerable to various cognitive distortions, such as the availability and representativeness heuristics, and especially confirmation bias (Dawes, 1994). Good research methodology is designed to protect those affected by scientific information from biases.
Consider a recent piece of investigative journalism, discussed by Adam Smith (2015), interviewing the families of four girls who had fallen seriously ill or died after receiving the Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine – some of whom were convinced the vaccine was the cause, despite robust evidence to the contrary. Scientist practitioners have a duty to understand why such a conclusion is unfounded, acknowledge that whānau and other stakeholders may hold similar beliefs, and then go a step further and apply those same critical thinking skills to their own professional experience.
A licence to practice psychology does not convey immunity to the above biases. Dawes (1994) and Meehl (1973) called attention to lack of any association between clinical experience and judgment accuracy or therapeutic outcome[5]. Nevertheless, clinicians tend to be overconfident (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018). Dawes argued that for learning to occur, clinicians would need to have immediate, consistent and unambiguous feedback when they made an error. However, this rarely happens in casework. Dawes argued that many practitioners allow themselves to be disproportionately influenced by single, powerful anecdotes. For the same reason the multiple cues pedagogy is a disaster for reading, we should be very wary of a clinician’s claim to be able to synthesize a vast array of contextual factors – it is simply beyond our cognitive capacity, and to suggest otherwise is reckless and potentially harmful (Dawes, 1994; Croskerry, 2013).
Is Reality Really Real?
Psychological constructivism begins with the somewhat reasonable (though arguably 'trivial'; von Glasersfeld, 1988, cited in Cobern & Loving, 2008, p. 433) assertion that learning involves some form of active construction on the part of the learner (Bell, 2005; Carr, et al., 1994). Constructivists disagree on the details (Jenkins, 2000; Nola, 1998), but most hold that knowledge is constructed in interaction either with other people, or the learner’s sensory experiences. These claims are often derived from a reading of Vygotsky and Piaget, respectively (Matthews, 2015)[2].
This fundamental insight is indeed trivial. One can easily agree that the concept of a table (rather than table itself) is some sort of psychological and/or social construction. Moreover, contrary to oft-repeated assertions by constructivists (von Glasersfeld 1990a, cited in Matthews, 2015), the importance of active engagement in learning has been widely recognized since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus (Jowett, n.d.; Nola, 1998). Determining the nature of this constructive process critical to informing the choice and interpretation of psychological assessments, as well as the appropriate priorities for the support provided to learners. Unfortunately, social constructivists often assume that trivial constructivism has direct practical applications (Nola, 1998; Jenkins, 2000). To some of these conclusions I will now turn.
The Lord of the Flies Approach to Active Learning
Constructivism has deeply influenced curricula and learning support programmes for maths, science and reading in New Zealand and worldwide. Pedagogical constructivists draw attention to the way that knowledge is “constructed by scientists […] and reconstructed by each learner of science” (Bell, 2005, p. 36). Each learner must construct their own understandings, depending crucially upon their preexisting knowledge structures (Shulman 1994, cited in Koertge, 1998; Carr, et al., 1994). Constructivists therefore echo the prescriptions of the discovery, problem-based, inquiry and experiential schools of previous decades: advocating minimal teacher guidance, as this is said to interfere with learning (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Mayer, 2004; von Glasersfeld 1990a, cited in Matthews, 2015). Because “learning and science proceed the same way” (Harlen, 1996, cited in Jenkins, 2000, p. 600; see also Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Bell, 2005), science students may be encouraged to emulate scientific discoveries, or to explore their prior understanding of scientific concepts within group discussions (Bell, 2005; Carr, et al., 1994). New Zealand’s well-entrenched (Tunmer & Chapman, 2015; Chapman, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2015) multiple cues reading pedagogy strongly discourages guided, skills-based learning (i.e. phonics), instead encouraging children to utilize their natural capacity to make sense of books using contextual information such as pictures or story context (Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015; Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013).
Galileo and Vygotsky had it right: abstract scientific concepts (such as the motion of a pendulum) may not have a basis in, and may even be contradicted by appearances and folk categories (Nola, 2004; Rowlands, 2000; Jenkins, 2000; Koertge, 1998). Indeed, a valuable goal for science should be to “separate common sense from common nonsense and make uncommon sense more common” (Stern, 1993, cited in Dawes, 1994, p. 6; see also Matthews, 1998b; Matthews, 2015). It is simply unreasonable to expect students to discover or invent for themselves scientific concepts that were centuries in the making. (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Nola, 1998; Matthews, 1998a; Rowlands, 2000). Some concepts are best conveyed linguistically (Matthews, 2015; Jenkins, 2000). The plausible constructivist idea that children are active sense-makers entails virtually nothing about pedagogy (Matthews, 2015; Nola, 1998; Jenkins, 2000; Ministry of Education, 2008), leading Hirsch (1996, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 320) to call constructivism “a kind of magical incantation.”
Which teaching methods best encourage engagement and learning is an empirical question (Mayer, 2004). Cognitive psychology has already provided some answers. Very broad problem solving contexts diverting precious working memory resources away from cognitive activity that is likely to result in long-term memory encoding, explicit guidance avoids this problem (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015; Mayer, 2004; Jenkins, 2000).
Constructivist programmes have also been evaluated more directly. Evidence against ‘discovery’ learning in maths and science began accumulating in the 60s, yet every decade since then, the ideology has reemerged with new branding, only to fail to find empirical support (Mayer, 2004; see also Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). Strong evidence suggests that constructivist reading programmes (including Aotearoa’s Reading Recovery) are ineffective (Matthews, 2015; Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013; Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015) and contribute to the widening gap in literacy achievement in New Zealand (Chapman, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2015; Tunmer, Chapman, Greaney, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2013; Prochnow, Tunmer, & Arrow, 2015).
The usefulness of worked examples and other forms of teacher guidance is well documented, especially for less expert learners (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006), and the same is true for phonemic awareness training (Ehri, et al., 2001; Tunmer, Greaney, & Prochnow, 2015; Tunmer & Chapman, 2015), criticisms notwithstanding (Pressley & Allington, 1999; Troia, 1999). Furthermore, effective teachers have been shown to disregard constructivist prescriptions and guide students in their learning (Aulls, 2002, cited in Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006).
Constructivists such as Bell may reply that their position is “not the same as discovery learning” (Bell, 2005, p. 35) and that teachers may provide guidance where necessary, or that constructivism recognizes “the distinction between learning public science and scientists constructing new public knowledge” (Bell, 2005, p. 38). This is a backtrack to a trivial position. The importance of engagement and prior conceptions in learning are widely acknowledged and were noted by the ancient Greeks. (Matthews, 1998a; Matthews, 2015; Jowett, n.d.; Nola, 1998). Non-trivial constructivist calls for educators to minimize direct guidance, however, should be disregarded by practitioners interested in supporting learners.
By Constituting a Shark in and through Discourse, We May Thereby Jump it
Sociological constructivism is committed to the explaining away of apparent scientific progress by characterizing it in terms of sociopolitical factors or by closely analyzing the meanings of texts (hermeneutics) - the truth or evidence-base of a scientific theory is explicitly ruled out at the outset (Bloor, 1991, cited in Boudry & Buekens, 2011). Reality “is the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause” (Latour and Woolgar, 1986, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 313); constituted in and through discourse. (Woolgar, 1986, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 313).
Accordingly, Western science is just one ideology amongst many (Koertge, 1998), one that legitimizes the oppression of women (Gilbert, 1995, cited in Bell, 2005; Hale, 1992, cited in Sullivan, 2000), ethnic minorities (Boghossian, 1998; Cobern & Loving, 2001) and people with disabilities (Ballard, 2004; Lalvani & Broderick, 2015; Rutherford & MacArthur, 2018; Slee, 2001), amongst others. All belief systems deserve to be called knowledge (Barnes, 1977, cited in Nanda, 1998). Many New Zealand frameworks for educational assessment have been influenced by this postmodernist doctrine. Below, I briefly consider Narrative Inquiry (Annan, Priestly, & Phillipson, 2006; White & Epston, 1990), Bourke and Loveridge’s[3] (2013) model of Evidence-Based Practice (EBP), as well as a Kaupapa Māori elaboration on the latter (Macfarlane & Macfarlane, 2013). Te Kotahitanga, a Kaupapa Māori programme for culturally responsive teaching will also be briefly considered in a later section.
Narrative inquiry asserts that “we cannot know objective reality” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 2), drawing attention to “the arbitrary construction of meaning for events” (Annan, Priestly, & Phillipson, 2006, p. 21), and how psychologists can therefore explore alternative narratives for ‘problems’ with stakeholders. A practitioner is to embrace narratives based upon “ideological and prevailing cultural practices [but not] correctness or accuracy” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 5). Annan and colleagues argue that “there is ample evidence to suggest that narrative approaches make valuable contributions” though my initial examination of the six books cited suggests this evidence may all be anecdotal[4].
Bourke and Loveridge’s (2013) EBP model is presented in Figure 2. Bourke and Loveridge contend that EBP occurs only when research evidence is integrated with the knowledge of the practitioner, children, and their families. They speak of practitioners’ ability to consider the broader context when interpreting assessment and fine-tuning support for learners, as well as the value of their situated experience in evaluating the success of such practices. Bourke and Loveridge also stress the importance of truly understanding the perspectives and cultural values of young people and stakeholders, such as when determining priorities for the educational psychologist’s involvement.
Macfarlane and Macfarlane (2013) provide a complementary Kaupapa Māori perspective on EBP. They argue that practitioners should draw from “indigenous cultural realities in shaping knowledge bases and pedagogies”. Along with Bourke and Loveridge (2013), the authors make a strong case for the importance of stakeholder participation in research. However, neither account explains how personal anecdote is to be integrated with research evidence. Should tuakana teina - a concept I admire – have its pedagogical applications subjected to the scrutiny of “Western” science? What if the scientific verdict were to contradict this cultural reality?
The Plural of Anecdote is Not Data
Considering others’ perspectives and cultures does not require the uncritical elevation of anecdote’s status as evidence (Smith and Elley, 1996, cited in Chapman, Prochnow, & Arrow, 2015), however. The plural of anecdote is not data. Anecdote is unsystematic, fails to compare to a hypothetical counterfactual, relies on retrospective memory and is hence vulnerable to various cognitive distortions, such as the availability and representativeness heuristics, and especially confirmation bias (Dawes, 1994). Good research methodology is designed to protect those affected by scientific information from biases.
Consider a recent piece of investigative journalism, discussed by Adam Smith (2015), interviewing the families of four girls who had fallen seriously ill or died after receiving the Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine – some of whom were convinced the vaccine was the cause, despite robust evidence to the contrary. Scientist practitioners have a duty to understand why such a conclusion is unfounded, acknowledge that whānau and other stakeholders may hold similar beliefs, and then go a step further and apply those same critical thinking skills to their own professional experience.
A licence to practice psychology does not convey immunity to the above biases. Dawes (1994) and Meehl (1973) called attention to lack of any association between clinical experience and judgment accuracy or therapeutic outcome[5]. Nevertheless, clinicians tend to be overconfident (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018). Dawes argued that for learning to occur, clinicians would need to have immediate, consistent and unambiguous feedback when they made an error. However, this rarely happens in casework. Dawes argued that many practitioners allow themselves to be disproportionately influenced by single, powerful anecdotes. For the same reason the multiple cues pedagogy is a disaster for reading, we should be very wary of a clinician’s claim to be able to synthesize a vast array of contextual factors – it is simply beyond our cognitive capacity, and to suggest otherwise is reckless and potentially harmful (Dawes, 1994; Croskerry, 2013).
Is Reality Really Real?
Constructivist perspectives on education are sometimes explicitly derived from quite ambitious philosophical claims. Von Glasersfeld’s Radical Constructivism (1998; 1993, cited in Nola, 1998; see also Bell, 2005; Gergen, 1990) embraces an empiricist[6]* (Yu, 2003; Nola, 1998; cf. Bell, 2005, p. 37) epistemology, holding that reality is inaccessible (Kitcher, 2001, cited in Matthews, 2015), so knowledge can only ever be about one’s subjective experience. Sociological constructivists typically make ontological* claims, for example by denying the existence of an external world or that reality is itself constructed by, and therefore relative to the knower (ontological relativism).
The fact that concepts are constructions, however, does not imply that their referent does not exist (Matthews, 2015, pp. 312-313). My concepts of horses and unicorns are both constructions, yet this fact alone doesn’t prevent me from asserting that only one of those concepts refers to a real thing. It is unclear what a constructivist is even referring to if they don’t believe in an external world (Nola, 2004). Are the other people in my society real, or do I create them through discourse? On the other hand, relativism is self-defeating (Boudry & Buekens, 2011), because if relativism is universally true, then not all truths are relative.
Constructivists sometimes criticize the scientists’ “naïve epistemologies” (Chan and Elliot 2004, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 316; see also von Glasersfeld, 1987, cited in Matthews), such as that knowledge is a “one-to-one reflection of or correspondence with the ‘real world’” (Bell, 2005, p. 36; Gergen, 1990). However, this is a caricature of “correspondence” (Greenwood, 1992) – scientific theories are idealizations that “map” rather than perfectly “mirror” the objective world (Chalmers, 1999; Manicas & Secord, 1983; Nola, 2004).
Constructivism’s sheer incoherence is aptly described by Suchting:
First, much of the doctrine known as ‘constructivism’ . . . is simply unintelligible. Second, to the extent that it is intelligible . . . it is simply confused. Third, there is a complete absence of any argument for whatever positions can be made out. . . . In general, far from being what it is claimed to be, namely, the New Age in philosophy of science, an even slightly perceptive ear can detect the familiar voice of a really quite primitive, traditional subjectivistic empiricism with some overtones of diverse provenance like Piaget and Kuhn. (Suchting, 1992, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 314)
There certainly seems to be a strong tendency for constructivist argument to obfuscate important distinctions (Sokal, 1996b; Jenkins, 2000; Nola, 1998; Nola, 2004; Matthews, 2015; Cobern & Loving, 2008). When called out, however, constructivists often backtrack on their more controversial claims in a frustratingly self-contradictory way (Boudry & Buekens, 2011). Kukla (2013, p. x) thus defines a switcheroo as arguing for a weaker claim, only to assume that a stronger claim has been supported; a reverse switcheroo involves asserting the stronger position, and when challenged, pretending that one was only making the weaker claim after all. Slezak (1988) has documented many examples of such practice; perhaps another example is Bell’s (2005, pp. 31-35) summary of criticisms of constructivism, where she plays a masterful game of bait-and-switch: responding to critiques against each form of constructivism by noting that some other version of constructivism avoids those problems. Furthermore, Bell appears to vacillate on whether a particular approach (Gilbert, 1997, cited in Bell) is really relativistic (pp. 33-34) or not (pp. 37-38). Such slipperiness effectively insulates constructivism from criticism.
Many constructivists, however, “question[…] rationality and objectivity” (Gilbert, 1993, cited in Matthews, 2015, pp. 317-318), or assert that “this so called looseness or vagueness has also been a strength, for it has allowed a creative development of thinking[…], which would not have been possible in a more closed theory, with precise definitions.” (Bell, 2005, p. 31). Similarly, White and Epston (1990, p. 81) position themselves in opposition to the “logico-scientific mode” and its preference for consistency, noncontradiction and clarity in language. Dennett (1995) has challenged the intellectual bankruptcy of such claims. Constructivists are as dependent as anybody else upon a shared understanding of consistency, rationality, etc when they attempt to persuade others of their views. To then deny the importance of reason is essentially to engage in “intellectual tennis without a net” (de Sousa, n.d., cited in Dennett, 1995) - a self-defeating form of hypocrisy.
Making Fiction out of History
If, as some constructivists claim, objective reality plays no part in distinguishing between knowledge and opinion, then it may be difficult to account for the apparent progress science has made over time (Boudry & Buekens, 2011; Manicas & Secord, 1983). Indeed, the strongest indictment of the postmodernist sociology of science tradition has been the quality of its historical and sociological scholarship. A House Built on Sand (Koertge, 1998) collates several critiques of these accounts, such as the misguided accusation that cellular biologists have historically downplayed the active role the egg plays in fertilization (Gross, 1998). The depths of the constructivist authors’ scientific illiteracy should come as no surprise, however, as two years prior, the NYU physicist Alan Sokal submitted Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity in a leading constructivist journal, Social Text. Eager to publish a sympathetic account from an actual scientist, the editors printed it (Sokal, 1996c). Yet the article was intentionally, and obviously, nonsensical – a hoax (Sokal, 1996a; 1996b). The hermeneuticists have thereby offered themselves as an ironic cautionary tale: when standpoint, rather than truth, becomes the arbiter of academic discourse, obfuscation and nonsense is the result. Though, as discussed in the previous section, some constructivists may view this as a compliment.
Sociology, history (and for that matter, economics, psychology, and other social sciences) no doubt have fascinating and enlightening insights into influence that human motivation and fallibility, for instance, affects the way science is carried out. However, “constructivism does not have a monopoly on these insights” (Matthews, 1998a, p. 7). Indeed, the ramblings of postmodernist scholarship have largely stood in the way of such an account.
The Ethical Responsibility of Scientist Practitioners
The Code of Ethics for Psychologists working in Aotearoa/New Zealand (2002) requires psychologists to respect and promote the welfare of others, and to honour the Treaty of Waitangi. Additionally, it conveys a responsibility to be scientific – using well-validated assessments and interpreting them responsibly, and to adopt theoretical perspectives that are backed by research. This commitment to utilize science in practice (and vice versa) was also made explicit in the influential Scientist-Practioner Model 50 years ago (Jones & Mehr, 2007; Belar, 2000). Psychology’s value to society, and therefore its mandate, lies in the promise of the scientific method (Dawes, 1994), and our privileged status as intellectuals (Chomsky, 1969, cited in Slezak, 1988) comes with the responsibility to act as the critics and conscience of society (Education Act 1989, 162 (4) v).
Sociological constructivists are correct, though hardly alone, in drawing attention to the way science is not value free, that sometimes the products of science are harmful to society (Cobern & Loving, 2008), and that knowledge is never absolute. The calls by constructivists (and others) for better dialogue and participation in research and practice (Bourke & Dharan, 2015; Bourke & Loveridge, 2013; Gómez, Puigvert, & Flecha, 2011; Macfarlane, Blampied, & Macfarlane, 2011; Macfarlane & Macfarlane, 2013; Racionero & Padrós, 2010) are fair enough. I would suggest that some authors with constructivist leanings could profitably jettison their commitment to constructivism and its more ridiculous claims, and that this would only serve to clarify and enhance their ethical and political causes.
Though these ethical concerns are valid, social constructivists often conflate factual questions (with which science is concerned) with questions of value. Yet one need not define knowledge as “increased access to participating roles” (Bell, 2005, p. 44) to advocate for the latter! Constructivists generally view their theories as being emancipatory, empowering, more respectful – in short: as being morally superior[7] (Matthews, 1998a, p. 6; Jenkins, 2000) The previously discussed rejection of notions truth, consistency and rationality are often explicitly motivated by moral concerns:
If, as feminist philosophers have argued, the pursuit of absolute truth does not necessarily go hand in hand with an end to domination, then it is logical that, for these feminist philosophers, there will be a move away from a concern for absolute truth, and a move towards a closer examination of the assumptions which underlie the very possibility of such a concept. (Gilbert, 1995, cited in Bell, 2005, p. 33)
This is tantamount to endorsing the moralistic fallacy – thinking that the moral consequences of an idea count towards its truth or falsity. However, a true concern for others – that is, wanting good outcomes for them - necessitates a concern for the facts (Koertge, 1998; Boghossian, 1998; Bunge, 2014). To say this is not to be hardhearted, but rather, hardheaded – a very different thing (Meehl, p. 255).
This conflation of “ought” and “is” is manifest in the support systems in place for New Zealand readers. Prochnow, Tunmer and Arrow (2015) describe the way that the Ministry of Education, seeking to address Aotearoa’s dismal literacy results for Māori and Pasifika students, have ignored the evidence that individual differences in “literate cultural capital” (contextual factors, such as being immersed in reading at home that may pave the way for learning to read in school) are leading to Matthews effects. That is, because the multiple cues pedagogy is especially ineffective for less experienced readers, the pre-existing gap at school entrance only widens. The Ministry’s approach has focused exclusively on culturally sensitive practices. Practice should be culturally sensitive. However, constructivist programmes such as Te Kotahitanga have rallied against responding to initial differences in literate cultural capital, or even talking about them. This is because literate cultural capital is a “deficit theory” and ipso facto, is culturally insensitive: “It is teachers positioning themselves in non-agentic positions through their deficit theorizing that is a major influence on Māori children’s academic and other achievement” (Bishop, et al., 2003, cited in Clark, 2013).
Teachers signing up to Te Kotahitanga are required to sign a declaration rejecting deficit theorizing. Clark (2013; see also Meehl, 1973) rightly condemns such dogmatism:
There is also something deeply disturbing about requiring participating teachers to sign up to a declaration which explicitly rejects all causal explanations but one, as if this would somehow eliminate the material forces at play which structurally hold the differential attainment in place. This is the very worst of academic indoctrination imposed by researchers committed to an academic ideology, where contrary views are simply not entertained, being rejected outright with no rational justification. (p. 251)
Need it be pointed out that if Prochnow and colleagues are correct, then Te Kotahitanga is hardly empowering Māori and Pasifika students? Further evidence that the politicization of epistemology is antithetical to social reform lies in its effect on the third world. Nanda (1998) has described how Western relativism has enabled, and at times encouraged (Harding, n.d., cited in Nanda) very conservative, regressive ideologies to insulate themselves from criticism in China, Pakistan, as well as India, her homeland. Relativism and pseudoscience may be especially dangerous when wedded to political power (Bunge, 2014; Boghossian, 1998). Sokal, a political liberal and whose hoax was borne of frustration with the academic Left, quotes Andreski: “so long as authority inspires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance conservative tendencies in society” (1972, cited in Sokal, 1996b, p. 4). Science’s demand that “authority be backed not by power but by reason” (Nanda, p. 306; see also Jacob, 1998; Koertge, 1998; Kitcher, 1998) threatens oppressive ideologies everywhere, thereby providing a much more promising avenue for supporting the learning of the marginalized and effecting positive societal change.
A Culture of Healthy Skepticism
It may be clear by now that my studies thus far have led me to the conclusion that New Zealand’s educational psychology discipline needs to up their game. Extreme constructivist ideology creates an artificial antagonism between liberal values and science. But psychology is the science of the mind, and as I have argued, constructivism’s prescriptions for assessment and pedagogy show a disregard for objectivity that, frankly, reduces psychology to the folk tales of the mind. I would contend that New Zealand learners deserve much better than folk psychology. On the other hand, all the valuable contributions of constructivist writings are compatible with a pro-science, realist conception of truth. I urge the entire discipline to work harder to challenge this ideology.
An important means of doing so might be for educational psychology programmes to emulate the philosophy tutorial classroom model in order to encourage more critical thinking within the discipline. Meehl’s description of case conferences, though harsh, describes my experience of education seminars:
The tradition of exaggerated tenderness in psychiatry and psychology reflects our “therapeutic attitude” and contrasts with that of scholars in fields like philosophy or law, where a dumb argument is called a dumb argument, and he who makes a dumb argument can expect to be slapped down by his peers. Nobody ever gives anybody negative reinforcement in a psychiatric case conference. (Try it once – you will be heard with horror and disbelief.) The most inane remark is received with joy and open arms as part of the groupthink process. Consequently the educational function, for either staff or students, is prevented from getting off the ground. (Meehl, 1973, p. 228)
This “exaggerated tenderness” reflects the kindhearted nature of people drawn to education, of course. But such kindheartedness need not conflict with the attitude of “healthy skepticism” that makes an effective scientist practitioner (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018).
Students might be brought together to discuss the issues that constructivism touches upon (evidence, objectivity, anecdotes), in the context of ethical or political dilemmas that might face a psychologist. Though this is already done to some extent, teacher guidance in the form of “devil’s advocate” questioning might encourage students to more explicitly state their positions and clarify their thinking[8]. If such a philosophical workout successfully boosts “the immune system that saves us from silliness” (Devitt, 1991, cited in Jenkins, 2000, p. 599) constructivism has been said to attack, then in doing so, it may serve to strengthen the assessment and learning support services offered by educational psychology in Aotearoa.
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The fact that concepts are constructions, however, does not imply that their referent does not exist (Matthews, 2015, pp. 312-313). My concepts of horses and unicorns are both constructions, yet this fact alone doesn’t prevent me from asserting that only one of those concepts refers to a real thing. It is unclear what a constructivist is even referring to if they don’t believe in an external world (Nola, 2004). Are the other people in my society real, or do I create them through discourse? On the other hand, relativism is self-defeating (Boudry & Buekens, 2011), because if relativism is universally true, then not all truths are relative.
Constructivists sometimes criticize the scientists’ “naïve epistemologies” (Chan and Elliot 2004, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 316; see also von Glasersfeld, 1987, cited in Matthews), such as that knowledge is a “one-to-one reflection of or correspondence with the ‘real world’” (Bell, 2005, p. 36; Gergen, 1990). However, this is a caricature of “correspondence” (Greenwood, 1992) – scientific theories are idealizations that “map” rather than perfectly “mirror” the objective world (Chalmers, 1999; Manicas & Secord, 1983; Nola, 2004).
Constructivism’s sheer incoherence is aptly described by Suchting:
First, much of the doctrine known as ‘constructivism’ . . . is simply unintelligible. Second, to the extent that it is intelligible . . . it is simply confused. Third, there is a complete absence of any argument for whatever positions can be made out. . . . In general, far from being what it is claimed to be, namely, the New Age in philosophy of science, an even slightly perceptive ear can detect the familiar voice of a really quite primitive, traditional subjectivistic empiricism with some overtones of diverse provenance like Piaget and Kuhn. (Suchting, 1992, cited in Matthews, 2015, p. 314)
There certainly seems to be a strong tendency for constructivist argument to obfuscate important distinctions (Sokal, 1996b; Jenkins, 2000; Nola, 1998; Nola, 2004; Matthews, 2015; Cobern & Loving, 2008). When called out, however, constructivists often backtrack on their more controversial claims in a frustratingly self-contradictory way (Boudry & Buekens, 2011). Kukla (2013, p. x) thus defines a switcheroo as arguing for a weaker claim, only to assume that a stronger claim has been supported; a reverse switcheroo involves asserting the stronger position, and when challenged, pretending that one was only making the weaker claim after all. Slezak (1988) has documented many examples of such practice; perhaps another example is Bell’s (2005, pp. 31-35) summary of criticisms of constructivism, where she plays a masterful game of bait-and-switch: responding to critiques against each form of constructivism by noting that some other version of constructivism avoids those problems. Furthermore, Bell appears to vacillate on whether a particular approach (Gilbert, 1997, cited in Bell) is really relativistic (pp. 33-34) or not (pp. 37-38). Such slipperiness effectively insulates constructivism from criticism.
Many constructivists, however, “question[…] rationality and objectivity” (Gilbert, 1993, cited in Matthews, 2015, pp. 317-318), or assert that “this so called looseness or vagueness has also been a strength, for it has allowed a creative development of thinking[…], which would not have been possible in a more closed theory, with precise definitions.” (Bell, 2005, p. 31). Similarly, White and Epston (1990, p. 81) position themselves in opposition to the “logico-scientific mode” and its preference for consistency, noncontradiction and clarity in language. Dennett (1995) has challenged the intellectual bankruptcy of such claims. Constructivists are as dependent as anybody else upon a shared understanding of consistency, rationality, etc when they attempt to persuade others of their views. To then deny the importance of reason is essentially to engage in “intellectual tennis without a net” (de Sousa, n.d., cited in Dennett, 1995) - a self-defeating form of hypocrisy.
Making Fiction out of History
If, as some constructivists claim, objective reality plays no part in distinguishing between knowledge and opinion, then it may be difficult to account for the apparent progress science has made over time (Boudry & Buekens, 2011; Manicas & Secord, 1983). Indeed, the strongest indictment of the postmodernist sociology of science tradition has been the quality of its historical and sociological scholarship. A House Built on Sand (Koertge, 1998) collates several critiques of these accounts, such as the misguided accusation that cellular biologists have historically downplayed the active role the egg plays in fertilization (Gross, 1998). The depths of the constructivist authors’ scientific illiteracy should come as no surprise, however, as two years prior, the NYU physicist Alan Sokal submitted Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity in a leading constructivist journal, Social Text. Eager to publish a sympathetic account from an actual scientist, the editors printed it (Sokal, 1996c). Yet the article was intentionally, and obviously, nonsensical – a hoax (Sokal, 1996a; 1996b). The hermeneuticists have thereby offered themselves as an ironic cautionary tale: when standpoint, rather than truth, becomes the arbiter of academic discourse, obfuscation and nonsense is the result. Though, as discussed in the previous section, some constructivists may view this as a compliment.
Sociology, history (and for that matter, economics, psychology, and other social sciences) no doubt have fascinating and enlightening insights into influence that human motivation and fallibility, for instance, affects the way science is carried out. However, “constructivism does not have a monopoly on these insights” (Matthews, 1998a, p. 7). Indeed, the ramblings of postmodernist scholarship have largely stood in the way of such an account.
The Ethical Responsibility of Scientist Practitioners
The Code of Ethics for Psychologists working in Aotearoa/New Zealand (2002) requires psychologists to respect and promote the welfare of others, and to honour the Treaty of Waitangi. Additionally, it conveys a responsibility to be scientific – using well-validated assessments and interpreting them responsibly, and to adopt theoretical perspectives that are backed by research. This commitment to utilize science in practice (and vice versa) was also made explicit in the influential Scientist-Practioner Model 50 years ago (Jones & Mehr, 2007; Belar, 2000). Psychology’s value to society, and therefore its mandate, lies in the promise of the scientific method (Dawes, 1994), and our privileged status as intellectuals (Chomsky, 1969, cited in Slezak, 1988) comes with the responsibility to act as the critics and conscience of society (Education Act 1989, 162 (4) v).
Sociological constructivists are correct, though hardly alone, in drawing attention to the way science is not value free, that sometimes the products of science are harmful to society (Cobern & Loving, 2008), and that knowledge is never absolute. The calls by constructivists (and others) for better dialogue and participation in research and practice (Bourke & Dharan, 2015; Bourke & Loveridge, 2013; Gómez, Puigvert, & Flecha, 2011; Macfarlane, Blampied, & Macfarlane, 2011; Macfarlane & Macfarlane, 2013; Racionero & Padrós, 2010) are fair enough. I would suggest that some authors with constructivist leanings could profitably jettison their commitment to constructivism and its more ridiculous claims, and that this would only serve to clarify and enhance their ethical and political causes.
Though these ethical concerns are valid, social constructivists often conflate factual questions (with which science is concerned) with questions of value. Yet one need not define knowledge as “increased access to participating roles” (Bell, 2005, p. 44) to advocate for the latter! Constructivists generally view their theories as being emancipatory, empowering, more respectful – in short: as being morally superior[7] (Matthews, 1998a, p. 6; Jenkins, 2000) The previously discussed rejection of notions truth, consistency and rationality are often explicitly motivated by moral concerns:
If, as feminist philosophers have argued, the pursuit of absolute truth does not necessarily go hand in hand with an end to domination, then it is logical that, for these feminist philosophers, there will be a move away from a concern for absolute truth, and a move towards a closer examination of the assumptions which underlie the very possibility of such a concept. (Gilbert, 1995, cited in Bell, 2005, p. 33)
This is tantamount to endorsing the moralistic fallacy – thinking that the moral consequences of an idea count towards its truth or falsity. However, a true concern for others – that is, wanting good outcomes for them - necessitates a concern for the facts (Koertge, 1998; Boghossian, 1998; Bunge, 2014). To say this is not to be hardhearted, but rather, hardheaded – a very different thing (Meehl, p. 255).
This conflation of “ought” and “is” is manifest in the support systems in place for New Zealand readers. Prochnow, Tunmer and Arrow (2015) describe the way that the Ministry of Education, seeking to address Aotearoa’s dismal literacy results for Māori and Pasifika students, have ignored the evidence that individual differences in “literate cultural capital” (contextual factors, such as being immersed in reading at home that may pave the way for learning to read in school) are leading to Matthews effects. That is, because the multiple cues pedagogy is especially ineffective for less experienced readers, the pre-existing gap at school entrance only widens. The Ministry’s approach has focused exclusively on culturally sensitive practices. Practice should be culturally sensitive. However, constructivist programmes such as Te Kotahitanga have rallied against responding to initial differences in literate cultural capital, or even talking about them. This is because literate cultural capital is a “deficit theory” and ipso facto, is culturally insensitive: “It is teachers positioning themselves in non-agentic positions through their deficit theorizing that is a major influence on Māori children’s academic and other achievement” (Bishop, et al., 2003, cited in Clark, 2013).
Teachers signing up to Te Kotahitanga are required to sign a declaration rejecting deficit theorizing. Clark (2013; see also Meehl, 1973) rightly condemns such dogmatism:
There is also something deeply disturbing about requiring participating teachers to sign up to a declaration which explicitly rejects all causal explanations but one, as if this would somehow eliminate the material forces at play which structurally hold the differential attainment in place. This is the very worst of academic indoctrination imposed by researchers committed to an academic ideology, where contrary views are simply not entertained, being rejected outright with no rational justification. (p. 251)
Need it be pointed out that if Prochnow and colleagues are correct, then Te Kotahitanga is hardly empowering Māori and Pasifika students? Further evidence that the politicization of epistemology is antithetical to social reform lies in its effect on the third world. Nanda (1998) has described how Western relativism has enabled, and at times encouraged (Harding, n.d., cited in Nanda) very conservative, regressive ideologies to insulate themselves from criticism in China, Pakistan, as well as India, her homeland. Relativism and pseudoscience may be especially dangerous when wedded to political power (Bunge, 2014; Boghossian, 1998). Sokal, a political liberal and whose hoax was borne of frustration with the academic Left, quotes Andreski: “so long as authority inspires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance conservative tendencies in society” (1972, cited in Sokal, 1996b, p. 4). Science’s demand that “authority be backed not by power but by reason” (Nanda, p. 306; see also Jacob, 1998; Koertge, 1998; Kitcher, 1998) threatens oppressive ideologies everywhere, thereby providing a much more promising avenue for supporting the learning of the marginalized and effecting positive societal change.
A Culture of Healthy Skepticism
It may be clear by now that my studies thus far have led me to the conclusion that New Zealand’s educational psychology discipline needs to up their game. Extreme constructivist ideology creates an artificial antagonism between liberal values and science. But psychology is the science of the mind, and as I have argued, constructivism’s prescriptions for assessment and pedagogy show a disregard for objectivity that, frankly, reduces psychology to the folk tales of the mind. I would contend that New Zealand learners deserve much better than folk psychology. On the other hand, all the valuable contributions of constructivist writings are compatible with a pro-science, realist conception of truth. I urge the entire discipline to work harder to challenge this ideology.
An important means of doing so might be for educational psychology programmes to emulate the philosophy tutorial classroom model in order to encourage more critical thinking within the discipline. Meehl’s description of case conferences, though harsh, describes my experience of education seminars:
The tradition of exaggerated tenderness in psychiatry and psychology reflects our “therapeutic attitude” and contrasts with that of scholars in fields like philosophy or law, where a dumb argument is called a dumb argument, and he who makes a dumb argument can expect to be slapped down by his peers. Nobody ever gives anybody negative reinforcement in a psychiatric case conference. (Try it once – you will be heard with horror and disbelief.) The most inane remark is received with joy and open arms as part of the groupthink process. Consequently the educational function, for either staff or students, is prevented from getting off the ground. (Meehl, 1973, p. 228)
This “exaggerated tenderness” reflects the kindhearted nature of people drawn to education, of course. But such kindheartedness need not conflict with the attitude of “healthy skepticism” that makes an effective scientist practitioner (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018).
Students might be brought together to discuss the issues that constructivism touches upon (evidence, objectivity, anecdotes), in the context of ethical or political dilemmas that might face a psychologist. Though this is already done to some extent, teacher guidance in the form of “devil’s advocate” questioning might encourage students to more explicitly state their positions and clarify their thinking[8]. If such a philosophical workout successfully boosts “the immune system that saves us from silliness” (Devitt, 1991, cited in Jenkins, 2000, p. 599) constructivism has been said to attack, then in doing so, it may serve to strengthen the assessment and learning support services offered by educational psychology in Aotearoa.
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Footnotes
[1] The study of knowledge; Figure 1 provides definitions for key terms – such terms are marked with an asterisk when they first appear. These definitions are not philosophically rigorous and are provided for ease of reading only.
[2] Whether Piaget or Vygotsky were correct or have been accurately interpreted is an open matter (Dawes, 1994; Rowlands, 2000; Nola, 1998) and outside the scope of this essay.
[3] I gather that the original article for this model was Bourke, R., Holden, B., & Curzon, J. (2005). Using evidence to challenge practice: A discussion paper. Ministry of Education: Wellington, New Zealand. Unfortunately, though quite influential, this article is not publicly available.
[4] This is an area for further research on my part, though I do not relish having to read another 5 constructivist books just to uncover this supposed evidence.
[5] I have yet to ascertain whether subsequent research has indicated an improvement in this regard. This is an area for further reading on my part.
[6] Bafflingly, many constructivists decry the “positivist*” nature of scientific research (Hammersley, 2001; White & Epston, 1990; Matthews, 1998b) even though the realist position adopted by many scientists is in opposition to positivism (Yu, 2003; Cobern & Loving, 2008; Matthews, 2015; Nola, 1998). Positivism, ironically, much more closely resembles the views of von Glasersfeld!
[7] Indeed, those who disagree with constructivists ought to tread carefully, lest they be accused of being pro-abuse, anti-feminist, supporting denial, politically right wing, etc (Dawes, 1994; Klein, 2007)
[8] It may be apparent that my recommendation is thoroughly constructivist – though this is of the trivial kind, given the importance placed on teacher intervention. And as mentioned previously, the Socratic Method came long before constructivism!
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